Security FAQ
Security questions, answered from the code and the design decisions of each Baseline edition. The security posture summary gives the reviewer's overview; the concept pages on least privilege and defense in depth give the reasoning.
Which compliance frameworks does the Baseline support?
Each edition evaluates its configuration continuously against the frameworks its code implements; none of this is a certification or an attestation, which remain your auditor's decision.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. The offerings note lists out-of-the-box compliance readiness for SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI DSS 4.0, CMMC, NIST CSF and the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark. In the code this is AWS Config with a
BuiltForProd-soc2-baselineconformance pack on by default and 28 further packs (HIPAA, PCI DSS v4, NIST CSF, CMMC 2.0, CIS Critical Security Controls v8 and service packs) switched on per requirement, plus Security Hub standards (CIS v5, Foundational Security Best Practices, PCI DSS v4, tagging) as switches. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. Azure Policy at
mg-acmeevaluates the customBuiltForProd-soc2-baselineinitiative (13 controls, Audit mode) and the Microsoft cloud security benchmark by default. Nine more built-in initiatives are free switches insecurity.hcl, assigned in DoNotEnforce mode: CIS Azure Foundations v3.0.0, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, PCI DSS v4, HITRUST/HIPAA, SOC 2 Type 2, ISO 27001:2013, CMMC 2.0 Level 2 and FedRAMP Moderate. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. The code implements the CIS Google Cloud Foundations Benchmark control by control: its logging and monitoring recommendations 2.4 to 2.11 as log-based metrics with alerts, and DNS query logging (2.12). Security Command Center reports misconfigurations at the organization. No other framework is mapped in the code.
Are there long-lived credentials?
No edition gives people or pipelines a long-lived credential:
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. A service control policy denies creating IAM users, login profiles and access keys in every member account. People sign in through IAM Identity Center with twelve-hour sessions; pipelines authenticate through GitHub OIDC; workloads use EKS Pod Identity. The only exception to the user rule is the root user of each account, whose email is a plus-addressed alias on a team mailbox.
- Azure Enterprise Baseline. A policy at
mg-acmedenies role assignments to individual users, so people get access only through Entra groups. Each blueprint repository signs in with one federated managed identity per stage that has no client secret, pods use Microsoft Entra Workload ID, Cosmos DB for MongoDB vCore accepts Entra principals only and Azure Managed Redis has access keys disabled. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Organization policies block creating and uploading service account keys. People use their Google identity through groups, pipelines authenticate through Workload Identity Federation, and pods are IAM principals through Workload Identity Federation for GKE; Firestore and Valkey take short-lived tokens, not passwords.
Who can change production?
In every edition only the platform leads and the DevOps leads hold administrative access to prod; every other group reads it.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline.
ACME_PlatformLeadsandACME_DevOpsLeadshold administrative permission sets inplat-prod. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. The platform leads hold Owner at
mg-acmeand the DevOps leads Owner on the plat subscriptions, standing or, withenable_pim, through PIM elevation groups activated for at most 12 hours with MFA, a justification and, for Owner on prod, a platform lead's approval. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. The lead groups reach Owner only through Privileged Access Manager grants of at most 12 hours, on by default; the DevOps leads' grant on the
platfolder needs a platform lead's approval.
In the pipelines, production applies wait for the prod GitHub Environment's required reviewers, and the production deploy pull request for the web application is merged by a person and then synced manually in ArgoCD.
How are secrets handled?
Application secrets live in the secrets repository of each edition, one YAML file per application per stage, encrypted with SOPS under one key per stage. The key's access policy, not GitHub, decides who can decrypt: the engineer groups for sandbox and dev, only the platform and DevOps leads for every stage, staging and prod included. A sync workflow delivers the values and the External Secrets Operator maps them into the pods. Plaintext is never committed, and rotation of application secrets is an edit, a review and a merge.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. KMS keys
acme-sops-<stage>; the sync writes SSM Parameter Store SecureStrings in the target account. The DocumentDB master password is created with write-only arguments, so it appears in neither plan nor state. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. RSA 4096 keys
sops-<stage>in the vaultkv-acme-eus2-sec-sops; the sync writes the application Key Vault of the stage. The data stores need no password. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Cloud KMS keys
sops-<stage>in the key ringacme-sops; each stage's syncer, which may only decrypt that stage's key, writes Secret Manager in the stage project. The data stores need no password.
Is everything encrypted?
Every edition encrypts data at rest by default and requires TLS in transit; customer-managed keys protect the audit trail and the secrets.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. Default EBS encryption in every account, SSE-KMS on the state bucket, the audit bucket and the data lake, encryption on DocumentDB and ElastiCache, customer-managed KMS keys with annual rotation for the audit trail and the per-stage secrets. Bucket policies deny TLS below 1.2 on the state and audit buckets, CloudFront uses
TLSv1.2_2021, load balancers listen on HTTPS only. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. Infrastructure encryption on every storage account and a customer-managed RSA 3072 key, rotated yearly, on the audit storage. Storage accepts HTTPS with TLS 1.2 only, and a Deny policy refuses any account that does not; the data stores accept TLS only.
- GCP Enterprise Baseline. Google encrypts everything by default, and a customer-managed Cloud KMS key, rotated yearly, protects the central audit bucket and the archive. Public endpoints use the SSL policy
MODERNwith TLS 1.2 as the minimum, and Firestore and Valkey connections use TLS.
What detects a threat or a misconfiguration?
Each edition runs its cloud's threat detection across every account, subscription or project from one switch file, environments/core/security/security.hcl, and routes high-severity events to one place.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. GuardDuty, Security Hub and IAM Access Analyzer are on, administered from
core-security; Inspector, Macie and Shield Advanced are switches with their prices. AWS Config records every supported resource type. High-severity GuardDuty findings, selected Config non-compliance and CIS CloudWatch alarms go to an SNS topic; a public S3 bucket is remediated automatically outsidecore-public. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. Microsoft Defender for Cloud runs the Containers, Storage, Key Vault and Resource Manager plans in every subscription. Ten CIS activity-log alerts per subscription, six KQL alerts on the audit workspace and every Defender alert of High or Critical severity notify the action group
ag-acme-security-alerts. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Security Command Center runs at the organization and sends HIGH and CRITICAL findings to a Pub/Sub topic; 13 log-based detections alert the security mailbox; Artifact Analysis scans every pushed image. An optional notifier removes public access from a bucket outside
acme-core-public.
Can a compromised account delete its own logs?
No. In every edition the audit trail is written to core-audit, outside the account, subscription or project it describes, and a control above that unit refuses deleting it.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. One organization CloudTrail delivers every account's events, with log file validation, to a KMS-encrypted, versioned, TLS-only bucket in
core-audit, and theacme-audit-protectionpolicy denies stopping or deleting CloudTrail and Config in every member account. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. The Activity Log of every subscription and the Entra ID logs reach the audit workspace and the write-once audit storage in
acme-core-audit; a DenyAction initiative atmg-acmeblocks deleting diagnostic settings, the workspace and the storage, andCanNotDeletelocks protect them. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Two aggregated organization sinks copy every project's audit logs into
acme-core-auditas they are written, and the IAM deny policyacme-audit-protectionat the organization denies deleting or changing the sinks and the audit buckets to everyone outside a short exception list, project Owners included.
How are prod and non-prod routed?
Every edition puts prod and non-prod in separate isolation domains that cannot reach each other, while both reach the hub.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. Transit Gateway route tables are split into the domains
prodandnonprod; each domain table carries a blackhole route for the address range of every stage outside it, so cross-domain traffic is dropped at the Transit Gateway. - Azure Enterprise Baseline. In the default egress mode, spoke route tables send
0.0.0.0/0and the organization range to Azure Firewall, whose policy allows traffic inside a domain and with the hub and denies the rest of the organization range. In the spoke NAT mode the spokes cannot reach each other at all. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Each domain is its own VPC in the Shared VPC host, peered with the hub and never with the other domain, so there is no route between them; the domain firewall policies also deny the other domains' ranges.
Is egress inspected?
Every edition sends egress through the hub or a NAT the platform controls; how much it inspects is a switch with its price beside it.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. AWS Network Firewall inspection in the hub is built and off by default because of its cost (about $865 per month for three AZ endpoints plus $0.065 per GB). When on, every spoke's egress passes a stateful policy with alert and flow logs.
- Azure Enterprise Baseline. Azure Firewall is the egress in the default mode,
hub_egress = "azure_firewall". Threat intelligence runs in Alert mode and switches to Deny withenable_firewall_threat_intel_deny; the Premium SKU adds intrusion detection in Alert mode. - GCP Enterprise Baseline. Cloud NAT carries egress, and each domain's network firewall policy allows only the ports it lists (TCP 80 and 443, UDP 53 and 123, and the hub and own domain) and ends with a logged deny of all other egress. Threat-intelligence deny rules are a switch.
How do engineers reach private resources?
Access to private resources is per group and per stage in every edition, from one access matrix in the code.
- AWS Enterprise Baseline. A single AWS Client VPN endpoint in the network account, federated with IAM Identity Center; off by default, single-AZ and split-tunnel when on.
- Azure Enterprise Baseline. A point-to-site VPN gateway (
VpnGw1AZ) with Microsoft Entra ID authentication and access profiles per group, off by default (enable_client_vpn, about $263 per month). - GCP Enterprise Baseline. No VPN: Identity-Aware Proxy TCP forwarding and OS Login, granted per group on each stage project, with optional bastions per isolation domain (
enable_bastion, about $7 per month each).
Does BuiltForProd keep access to my environment?
Not after handover, unless you engage Managed. The deployment is executed by BuiltForProd's team into your accounts, subscriptions or projects; the repositories and the environment are yours. Under Managed, the access you grant and its scope are set out in your agreement; see the shared responsibility model.
How is the supply chain protected?
Every GitHub Action in every edition is pinned to a commit SHA, and providers and tools to exact versions. Pre-commit and CI run Checkov and tflint on infrastructure, with Trivy in pre-commit everywhere and in CI on AWS and Azure; code repositories run Trivy image scans that fail on fixable critical and high vulnerabilities. Container images run as a fixed non-root user, and each registry refuses to change a pushed tag: ECR tag immutability, Azure Container Registry tag locks, Artifact Registry immutable tags. See policy as code.