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IAM

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) decides who can do what on which resource in an AWS account. The platform uses IAM roles for every identity, human and machine, and never creates IAM users.

What it does​

IAM has two kinds of identity. An IAM user is a permanent identity with a password or long-lived access keys. An IAM role is an identity that is assumed for a session and hands out temporary credentials. A role has a trust policy (who may assume it) and permission policies (what it may do). Policies are JSON documents of allow and deny statements. AWS also provides managed policies such as AdministratorAccess, PowerUserAccess and ReadOnlyAccess, and service-linked roles that a service creates for itself.

IAM is a global service: a role exists once per account, not per region. That is why the platform places IAM units in global/ folders.

How BuiltForProd uses it​

The acme-security-guardrails SCP denies creating IAM users, login profiles and access keys in every member account. People sign in through IAM Identity Center, whose permission sets become IAM roles in each account. Machines use roles with narrow trust policies. The AWS Baseline creates these:

RoleAccountPurpose
acme-terraform-deployerEvery account, from modules/account-baselineThe entry point for pipelines that write; carries AdministratorAccess; trusts only acme-*-deployer roles in core-auto and, in plat-* accounts, that stage's secrets syncer
acme-terraform-readerEvery account, from modules/account-baselineThe entry point for the plan and drift jobs; carries ReadOnlyAccess plus KMS decrypt through S3, and is denied Secrets Manager values and SecureString decryption; trusts only acme-*-reader and acme-*-planner roles in core-auto
acme-aws-platform-baseline-deployercore-auto, from modules/github-oidcThe baseline apply job; accepts only environment:prod tokens and may assume acme-terraform-* in every account
acme-aws-platform-baseline-readercore-auto, from modules/github-oidcThe baseline plan and drift jobs; may assume only acme-terraform-reader
acme-<repo>-<stage>-deployercore-auto, from modules/github-oidcOne role per blueprint repository and stage, such as acme-aws-blueprint-webapp-infra-dev-deployer; accepts only environment:<stage> tokens and may assume only that stage account's acme-terraform-deployer
acme-<repo>-buildcore-auto, from modules/github-oidcOne role per code repository for the image build on main; may push to that repository's ECR repository only
acme-terraform-state-accesscore-rootRead and write access to the whole state bucket for the baseline's CI deployer and the ManagementAdminAccess and PlatformAdminAccess SSO roles; denied to every other principal of the plat-* stage accounts
acme-terraform-state-<stage>core-rootOne per plat-* account; trusted by that account's acme-terraform-deployer and the admin and DevOps lead SSO roles, and limited to that stage's blueprint state keys
acme-route53-cross-accountcore-dns and core-networkLets workload accounts write ACM validation and ExternalDNS records into the public and private zones
acme-secrets-syncer-<stage>core-securityOne per stage; assumed by that stage's secrets repository jobs to decrypt that stage's SOPS files and write its parameters
acme-<stage>-config-roleMember accountsThe AWS Config recorder role; the management account uses the service-linked role instead

Every automation role carries the tag mfa-exempt = true so the guardrails SCP does not block it. Cross-account access always goes through one of these purpose-built roles, never through broad trust between accounts.

The blueprints add workload roles: EKS Pod Identity roles for the AWS Load Balancer Controller, ExternalDNS, the External Secrets Operator and the application service account; an IRSA role for Fluent Bit; the Glue job role; the Lambda execution role; and the Lake Formation service role. Each is scoped to its own log group, parameter path or bucket.

Two review tools watch the result. IAM Access Analyzer reports resources shared outside the organization and roles unused for 90 days. The SecurityAuditorAccess permission set can read IAM configuration but is explicitly denied data-plane reads such as s3:GetObject and ssm:GetParameter.

Terms you will see​

TermMeaning
RoleAn identity assumed for a session; the only identity type the platform creates.
Trust policyThe part of a role that names who may assume it.
Managed policyAn AWS-maintained policy such as ReadOnlyAccess, attached by ARN.
Inline policyA policy written into one role or permission set.
Service-linked roleA role an AWS service creates and owns for its own use.
IRSAIAM Roles for Service Accounts, the older way to give a Kubernetes pod a role.
Pod IdentityThe EKS feature that associates a role with a Kubernetes service account.

Where to read more​