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Security posture summary

This page lists the security controls each edition of the Baseline and its blueprints put in place, with the default state of each, so a security reviewer can answer a questionnaire from one page. Every cell names a mechanism in the code: "On" is active after deployment, "Off" is built and switched on with one setting whose price is stated beside it, and "—" means the edition has no control of that kind.

The editions are the AWS, Azure and GCP Enterprise Baseline. The Secure and Compliant pillar pages explain each group of controls.

Account structure and preventive controls​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
Single-purpose unitsOn: 15 accounts, a management account and 14 in the core and plat OUsOn: 15 subscriptions under the management groups mg-acme, mg-acme-core, mg-acme-platOn: 15 projects in the core, plat and backup folders
No user credentialsOn: SCP denies IAM users, login profiles and access keysOn: Deny of role assignments to individual users, at mg-acmeOn: constraints block service account key creation and upload
Public storage blockedOn: SCP protects the S3 public-access block; public account exceptedOn: Deny on public blob access and shared keys; acme-core-public exemptOn: public access prevention, uniform bucket access; acme-core-public excepted
MFA for peopleOn: SCP denies actions without MFA outside SSO and platform rolesReport-only: five Conditional Access policies, including phishing-resistant MFA for admins—
Region restrictionOn: SCP allows the home region, folder regions and us-east-1On: Deny outside the home region and the regions with foldersOn: gcp.resourceLocations: home region, folder regions, us multi-region
Audit protectionOn: SCP denies stopping or changing CloudTrail and AWS ConfigOn: DenyAction on diagnostic settings, the audit workspace and the audit storageOn: IAM deny policy on audit sinks, log buckets and the archive
Compute exposure—On: Deny of public IPs on network interfacesOn: no external VM IPs, OS Login, Shielded VMs, no serial ports
Per-unit baselineOn: EBS encryption, S3 public-access block, AWS Config, deployer and read-only reader rolesOn: Defender plans, Activity Log export, Network Watcher, locked resource groupOn: API list, de-privileged default service account, OS Login, Essential Contacts
Tag or label policyReport-only: tag keys and values; enforcement is one switchAudit: tag values, Modify copies missing tags; Deny with enforce_tag_policyDry run: custom label constraints; enforced with enforce_label_policy

Identity and access​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
One identity planeOn: IAM Identity Center, twelve permission sets by ACME_* groupOn: 13 ACME_* Entra groups plus ACME_BreakGlass, Azure RBACOn: 14 Google groups bound to IAM role bundles
Least privilege toward prodOn: PowerUser below prod, ReadOnly in prod; two lead groups change prodOn: Contributor below prod, read-only on prod; Owner only for two lead groupsOn: editor bundle below prod, viewer on prod; Owner only for the lead groups
Time-bound elevation—Off: enable_pim, PIM for Groups, at most 12 hours with MFA; Entra ID P2, about $9 per user per monthOn: Privileged Access Manager Owner grants, at most 12 hours, approval for wider grants
Auditors cannot read dataOn: explicit deny on S3 objects, parameters, secrets, database data, log eventsOn: Security Reader and acme-security-auditor, no data actionsOn: deny policies on object, secret, table and document reads, and workload logs
Keyless CIOn: GitHub OIDC into auto, one role per blueprint repository and stage; a read-only role for Baseline plans and driftOn: one federated managed identity per blueprint repository and stage, exact subjects, no client secretOn: Workload Identity Federation, one CI service account per blueprint repository and stage; a read-only drift account
Deployer scopeOn: acme-terraform-deployer trusts only acme-*-deployer roles in auto; each blueprint stage role reaches only its own stage's accountOn: each blueprint infrastructure identity holds acme-blueprint-deployer on its own stage's plat subscription onlyOn: infrastructure CI accounts impersonate only their stage project's deployer, which owns only its project; code CI accounts hold direct grants only
Workload identityOn: EKS Pod Identity; IRSA only for Fluent BitOn: Microsoft Entra Workload ID for pods; managed identities for jobsOn: Workload Identity Federation for GKE; dedicated service accounts
Unused access reviewOn: IAM Access Analyzer unused-access analyzer, 90 days——

Network​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
Prod and non-prod apartOn: Transit Gateway route table per domain, blackholing the other's rangesOn: firewall policy rule collections deny traffic between domainsOn: one VPC per domain, peered only with the hub
Central egressOn: NAT per AZ in the hub; spokes have no NATOn: Azure Firewall Standard, about $912 per month; spoke NAT mode is a switchOn: Cloud NAT per VPC per region, about $32 per month each
Egress filteringOff: Network Firewall, about $865 per month plus $0.065 per GBOn: firewall rules, threat intelligence in Alert; Deny by switch; Premium adds IDPSOn: each domain policy ends with a logged egress deny; threat-intel rules off
Inbound from the internetOn: internet gateways only for load balancer subnetsOn: each workload subnet's NSG denies inbound traffic from the internetOn: no external VM IPs; the IAP range reaches tagged targets only
Web application firewallOn: Firewall Manager WAF web ACL on every workload load balancerOn: Front Door WAF from the Baseline's template, Prevention modeOn: Cloud Armor policy per endpoint from the Baseline's template
DDoS protectionShield Standard on; Shield Advanced off, $3,000 per monthOff: DDoS Network Protection, $2,944 per monthOn: Cloud Armor adaptive protection; Cloud Armor Enterprise off, $3,000 per month
Service perimeter——Off: VPC Service Controls around the plat projects, dry run first
Private service accessOn: S3 gateway endpointsOn: private endpoints for the stage vaults and data storesOn: Private Google Access; Private Service Connect to Valkey
Remote accessOff until configured: Client VPN, SAML with Identity CenterOff: point-to-site VPN with Entra ID, about $263 per monthOn: IAP TCP forwarding and OS Login per group; bastions off, about $7 per month each
Kubernetes network policyOn: default-deny with an allow-list, VPC CNI agentOn: default-deny with an allow-list, CiliumOn: default-deny with an allow-list, Dataplane V2
DNS integrityOn: DNSSEC and query logging on the apex, prod and staging zonesOn: DNSSEC on the apex, prod and staging zonesOn: DNSSEC on the apex, prod and staging zones; VPC DNS query logging

Encryption​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
At restOn: KMS keys rotated yearly for audit and SOPS; EBS default; SSE-KMSOn: infrastructure encryption on every storage account; RSA 3072 key on audit storageOn: Google default encryption; CMEK on the audit bucket and archive, rotated yearly
In transitOn: TLS 1.2 bucket policies, CloudFront TLSv1.2_2021, HTTPS load balancersOn: HTTPS only and TLS 1.2 on storage, denied otherwise by policyOn: TLS to Google APIs; SSL policy MODERN with TLS 1.2 on public endpoints
SecretsOn: SOPS per stage, SSM SecureStrings, External SecretsOn: SOPS with RSA 4096 Key Vault keys, application Key Vault, External SecretsOn: SOPS with Cloud KMS keys, Secret Manager, External Secrets
No database passwordsOn: DocumentDB password written with write-only arguments, never in stateOn: Cosmos DB accepts Entra principals only; Redis access keys disabledOn: Firestore with MONGODB-OIDC; Valkey with IAM authentication
Key protectionOn: customer-managed keys with annual rotationOn: 90-day soft delete and purge protection on every vaultOn: keys never deleted; prevent_destroy on every key

Detection and response​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
Threat detectionOn: GuardDuty with S3, EKS audit log and EBS malware protectionOn: Defender for Containers, Storage, Key Vault and Resource ManagerOn: Security Command Center, Standard tier, at the organization
Posture evaluationOn: Security Hub; AWS Config with the SOC 2 baseline packOn: SOC 2 baseline initiative and Microsoft cloud security benchmarkOn: Security Health Analytics findings; sandbox muted
Vulnerability scanningOff: Inspector for EC2, ECR and LambdaOn: Defender for Containers scans the registryOn: Artifact Analysis on push, about $0.26 per image
Sensitive dataOff: MacieOn: Defender for Storage sensitive-data threat detection; malware scanning off—
SIEM—Off: Microsoft Sentinel, $2.46 per GB—
High-signal alertingOn: seven CIS metric filters, GuardDuty severity 7 and above, SNS topicOn: 10 activity-log, 6 KQL and Defender alerts to one action groupOn: 13 log-based detections by email; HIGH and CRITICAL findings to Pub/Sub
Automated responseOn: EventBridge and SSM remove public access from a reported bucketOn: prevention at request time by Deny, DenyAction and Modify policiesOff: notifier removes public bucket bindings outside acme-core-public

Evidence​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
Audit trailOn: multi-region organization CloudTrail with log file validationOn: Activity Log of every subscription and Microsoft Entra ID logsOn: Admin Activity and Data Access logs through two organization sinks
Network flow evidenceOn: VPC Flow Logs for all traffic from every VPCOn: VNet flow logs from every VNet to the audit storageOn: flow logs on every workload subnet, every flow sampled
Tamper-resistant archiveOn: log-archive account bucket, versioned, current objects never deletedOn: write-once audit storage for 365 days, customer-managed key, delete locksOn: archive bucket with a 365-day retention policy and CMEK; lock switches
Central viewOn: CloudWatch OAM sink in securityOn: audit, security and stage workspaces; Log Analytics Reader for auditorsOn: metrics scope in acme-core-security; central log bucket with Log Analytics
Change historyOn: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issuesOn: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issuesOn: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issues

Supply chain​

ControlAWS Enterprise BaselineAzure Enterprise BaselineGCP Enterprise Baseline
Infrastructure scanningOn: tofu fmt, tflint, Checkov, Trivy in pre-commit and CIOn: tflint azurerm ruleset, Checkov as the gate, Trivy, in pre-commit and CIOn: tflint google ruleset and Checkov in CI; Trivy in pre-commit
Image scanningOn: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilitiesOn: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilitiesOn: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities
Immutable artifactsOn: ECR tag immutability; built once, promoted by tagOn: registry tags locked after push; built once, promoted by tagOn: Artifact Registry immutable tags; built once, promoted by tag
Hardened containersOn: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities droppedOn: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities dropped, Pod Security Standard restrictedOn: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities dropped, Pod Security Standard restricted
Pinned dependenciesOn: actions pinned to commit SHAs; modules and tools to exact versionsOn: actions pinned to commit SHAs; tools checksum-verified; no registry modulesOn: actions pinned to commit SHAs; tools pinned; no registry modules

Reading further​

The defense in depth page explains why the controls are layered, and the security FAQ answers the questions reviewers ask most. The public overviews of the AWS, Azure and GCP Enterprise Baselines describe each edition.