Security posture summary
This page lists the security controls each edition of the Baseline and its blueprints put in place, with the default state of each, so a security reviewer can answer a questionnaire from one page. Every cell names a mechanism in the code: "On" is active after deployment, "Off" is built and switched on with one setting whose price is stated beside it, and "—" means the edition has no control of that kind.
The editions are the AWS, Azure and GCP Enterprise Baseline. The Secure and Compliant pillar pages explain each group of controls.
Account structure and preventive controls
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single-purpose units | On: 15 accounts, a management account and 14 in the core and plat OUs | On: 15 subscriptions under the management groups mg-acme, mg-acme-core, mg-acme-plat | On: 15 projects in the core, plat and backup folders |
| No user credentials | On: SCP denies IAM users, login profiles and access keys | On: Deny of role assignments to individual users, at mg-acme | On: constraints block service account key creation and upload |
| Public storage blocked | On: SCP protects the S3 public-access block; public account excepted | On: Deny on public blob access and shared keys; acme-core-public exempt | On: public access prevention, uniform bucket access; acme-core-public excepted |
| MFA for people | On: SCP denies actions without MFA outside SSO and platform roles | Report-only: five Conditional Access policies, including phishing-resistant MFA for admins | — |
| Region restriction | On: SCP allows the home region, folder regions and us-east-1 | On: Deny outside the home region and the regions with folders | On: gcp.resourceLocations: home region, folder regions, us multi-region |
| Audit protection | On: SCP denies stopping or changing CloudTrail and AWS Config | On: DenyAction on diagnostic settings, the audit workspace and the audit storage | On: IAM deny policy on audit sinks, log buckets and the archive |
| Compute exposure | — | On: Deny of public IPs on network interfaces | On: no external VM IPs, OS Login, Shielded VMs, no serial ports |
| Per-unit baseline | On: EBS encryption, S3 public-access block, AWS Config, deployer and read-only reader roles | On: Defender plans, Activity Log export, Network Watcher, locked resource group | On: API list, de-privileged default service account, OS Login, Essential Contacts |
| Tag or label policy | Report-only: tag keys and values; enforcement is one switch | Audit: tag values, Modify copies missing tags; Deny with enforce_tag_policy | Dry run: custom label constraints; enforced with enforce_label_policy |
Identity and access
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| One identity plane | On: IAM Identity Center, twelve permission sets by ACME_* group | On: 13 ACME_* Entra groups plus ACME_BreakGlass, Azure RBAC | On: 14 Google groups bound to IAM role bundles |
| Least privilege toward prod | On: PowerUser below prod, ReadOnly in prod; two lead groups change prod | On: Contributor below prod, read-only on prod; Owner only for two lead groups | On: editor bundle below prod, viewer on prod; Owner only for the lead groups |
| Time-bound elevation | — | Off: enable_pim, PIM for Groups, at most 12 hours with MFA; Entra ID P2, about $9 per user per month | On: Privileged Access Manager Owner grants, at most 12 hours, approval for wider grants |
| Auditors cannot read data | On: explicit deny on S3 objects, parameters, secrets, database data, log events | On: Security Reader and acme-security-auditor, no data actions | On: deny policies on object, secret, table and document reads, and workload logs |
| Keyless CI | On: GitHub OIDC into auto, one role per blueprint repository and stage; a read-only role for Baseline plans and drift | On: one federated managed identity per blueprint repository and stage, exact subjects, no client secret | On: Workload Identity Federation, one CI service account per blueprint repository and stage; a read-only drift account |
| Deployer scope | On: acme-terraform-deployer trusts only acme-*-deployer roles in auto; each blueprint stage role reaches only its own stage's account | On: each blueprint infrastructure identity holds acme-blueprint-deployer on its own stage's plat subscription only | On: infrastructure CI accounts impersonate only their stage project's deployer, which owns only its project; code CI accounts hold direct grants only |
| Workload identity | On: EKS Pod Identity; IRSA only for Fluent Bit | On: Microsoft Entra Workload ID for pods; managed identities for jobs | On: Workload Identity Federation for GKE; dedicated service accounts |
| Unused access review | On: IAM Access Analyzer unused-access analyzer, 90 days | — | — |
Network
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prod and non-prod apart | On: Transit Gateway route table per domain, blackholing the other's ranges | On: firewall policy rule collections deny traffic between domains | On: one VPC per domain, peered only with the hub |
| Central egress | On: NAT per AZ in the hub; spokes have no NAT | On: Azure Firewall Standard, about $912 per month; spoke NAT mode is a switch | On: Cloud NAT per VPC per region, about $32 per month each |
| Egress filtering | Off: Network Firewall, about $865 per month plus $0.065 per GB | On: firewall rules, threat intelligence in Alert; Deny by switch; Premium adds IDPS | On: each domain policy ends with a logged egress deny; threat-intel rules off |
| Inbound from the internet | On: internet gateways only for load balancer subnets | On: each workload subnet's NSG denies inbound traffic from the internet | On: no external VM IPs; the IAP range reaches tagged targets only |
| Web application firewall | On: Firewall Manager WAF web ACL on every workload load balancer | On: Front Door WAF from the Baseline's template, Prevention mode | On: Cloud Armor policy per endpoint from the Baseline's template |
| DDoS protection | Shield Standard on; Shield Advanced off, $3,000 per month | Off: DDoS Network Protection, $2,944 per month | On: Cloud Armor adaptive protection; Cloud Armor Enterprise off, $3,000 per month |
| Service perimeter | — | — | Off: VPC Service Controls around the plat projects, dry run first |
| Private service access | On: S3 gateway endpoints | On: private endpoints for the stage vaults and data stores | On: Private Google Access; Private Service Connect to Valkey |
| Remote access | Off until configured: Client VPN, SAML with Identity Center | Off: point-to-site VPN with Entra ID, about $263 per month | On: IAP TCP forwarding and OS Login per group; bastions off, about $7 per month each |
| Kubernetes network policy | On: default-deny with an allow-list, VPC CNI agent | On: default-deny with an allow-list, Cilium | On: default-deny with an allow-list, Dataplane V2 |
| DNS integrity | On: DNSSEC and query logging on the apex, prod and staging zones | On: DNSSEC on the apex, prod and staging zones | On: DNSSEC on the apex, prod and staging zones; VPC DNS query logging |
Encryption
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| At rest | On: KMS keys rotated yearly for audit and SOPS; EBS default; SSE-KMS | On: infrastructure encryption on every storage account; RSA 3072 key on audit storage | On: Google default encryption; CMEK on the audit bucket and archive, rotated yearly |
| In transit | On: TLS 1.2 bucket policies, CloudFront TLSv1.2_2021, HTTPS load balancers | On: HTTPS only and TLS 1.2 on storage, denied otherwise by policy | On: TLS to Google APIs; SSL policy MODERN with TLS 1.2 on public endpoints |
| Secrets | On: SOPS per stage, SSM SecureStrings, External Secrets | On: SOPS with RSA 4096 Key Vault keys, application Key Vault, External Secrets | On: SOPS with Cloud KMS keys, Secret Manager, External Secrets |
| No database passwords | On: DocumentDB password written with write-only arguments, never in state | On: Cosmos DB accepts Entra principals only; Redis access keys disabled | On: Firestore with MONGODB-OIDC; Valkey with IAM authentication |
| Key protection | On: customer-managed keys with annual rotation | On: 90-day soft delete and purge protection on every vault | On: keys never deleted; prevent_destroy on every key |
Detection and response
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Threat detection | On: GuardDuty with S3, EKS audit log and EBS malware protection | On: Defender for Containers, Storage, Key Vault and Resource Manager | On: Security Command Center, Standard tier, at the organization |
| Posture evaluation | On: Security Hub; AWS Config with the SOC 2 baseline pack | On: SOC 2 baseline initiative and Microsoft cloud security benchmark | On: Security Health Analytics findings; sandbox muted |
| Vulnerability scanning | Off: Inspector for EC2, ECR and Lambda | On: Defender for Containers scans the registry | On: Artifact Analysis on push, about $0.26 per image |
| Sensitive data | Off: Macie | On: Defender for Storage sensitive-data threat detection; malware scanning off | — |
| SIEM | — | Off: Microsoft Sentinel, $2.46 per GB | — |
| High-signal alerting | On: seven CIS metric filters, GuardDuty severity 7 and above, SNS topic | On: 10 activity-log, 6 KQL and Defender alerts to one action group | On: 13 log-based detections by email; HIGH and CRITICAL findings to Pub/Sub |
| Automated response | On: EventBridge and SSM remove public access from a reported bucket | On: prevention at request time by Deny, DenyAction and Modify policies | Off: notifier removes public bucket bindings outside acme-core-public |
Evidence
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit trail | On: multi-region organization CloudTrail with log file validation | On: Activity Log of every subscription and Microsoft Entra ID logs | On: Admin Activity and Data Access logs through two organization sinks |
| Network flow evidence | On: VPC Flow Logs for all traffic from every VPC | On: VNet flow logs from every VNet to the audit storage | On: flow logs on every workload subnet, every flow sampled |
| Tamper-resistant archive | On: log-archive account bucket, versioned, current objects never deleted | On: write-once audit storage for 365 days, customer-managed key, delete locks | On: archive bucket with a 365-day retention policy and CMEK; lock switches |
| Central view | On: CloudWatch OAM sink in security | On: audit, security and stage workspaces; Log Analytics Reader for auditors | On: metrics scope in acme-core-security; central log bucket with Log Analytics |
| Change history | On: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issues | On: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issues | On: pull request, plan, review, apply; drift issues |
Supply chain
| Control | AWS Enterprise Baseline | Azure Enterprise Baseline | GCP Enterprise Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infrastructure scanning | On: tofu fmt, tflint, Checkov, Trivy in pre-commit and CI | On: tflint azurerm ruleset, Checkov as the gate, Trivy, in pre-commit and CI | On: tflint google ruleset and Checkov in CI; Trivy in pre-commit |
| Image scanning | On: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities | On: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities | On: Trivy fails on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities |
| Immutable artifacts | On: ECR tag immutability; built once, promoted by tag | On: registry tags locked after push; built once, promoted by tag | On: Artifact Registry immutable tags; built once, promoted by tag |
| Hardened containers | On: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities dropped | On: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities dropped, Pod Security Standard restricted | On: UID 10001, read-only root filesystem, capabilities dropped, Pod Security Standard restricted |
| Pinned dependencies | On: actions pinned to commit SHAs; modules and tools to exact versions | On: actions pinned to commit SHAs; tools checksum-verified; no registry modules | On: actions pinned to commit SHAs; tools pinned; no registry modules |
Reading further
The defense in depth page explains why the controls are layered, and the security FAQ answers the questions reviewers ask most. The public overviews of the AWS, Azure and GCP Enterprise Baselines describe each edition.